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The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: 








A defense of equality for great apes must begin with an understanding of the opposition and an 
acknowledgement of the most basic point of disagreement. For great apes to gain status as 
persons in our community, we must begin by determining what the multitude of different 
definitions of "person" have in common. Finding that great apes fulfill the requirements of any 
one specific theory of personhood is insufficient, for these theories are highly controversial, and 
a critique of the theory will undermine the status of great apes as persons. Instead, the first step 
in the argument for ape equality must be a defense of their self-consciousness. This notion is 
one thing all plausible theories of personhood have in common. 
Contrary to most people's common conceptions, many philosophers have argued that 
great apes, as well as all nonhuman animals, lack consciousness.1 This notion must be 
demolished before any argument for the equality of great apes can be fully defended. Here it will 
be helpful to distinguish the conceptions of consciousness I will be using in this paper. The 
debate surrounding the issue of consciousness makes a precise definition impossible. For the 
scope of this paper it will suffice to present two general conceptions of consciousness. The 
types of consciousness usually at the center of controversy regarding animal minds are 
perceptual consciousness and reflective consciousness. Perceptual consciousness is the 
general awareness of one's surroundings. Many behavioral scientists and philosophers believe 
it is likely some animals have this type of consciousness.2 Reflective consciousness, however, 
is more often considered to be a uniquely human capacity. For this variety of consciousness 
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those thoughts. This consciousness is not simple phenomenological awareness, but pertains to some 
propositional attitudes referring to one's self. It is this reflective consciousness that I will focus on for the 
argument from analogy and will be what I am referring to in all subsequent uses of "consciousness". 
The view that humans are different and enjoy an elevated moral status rests on the belief that 
humans alone are self-conscious rational beings. Justification for that belief, however, reflects a faulty 
conception of the mental lives of many animals, especially the great apes. In this paper I will argue that 
our justification for accepting other human minds suffices to justify the existence of great ape minds as 
well. One who accepts the existence of human minds is then rationally compelled to accept the existence 
of great ape minds in general. Once it can be shown that we have good reason for believing that great 
apes are conscious rational beings, the case for personhood is easy to make and will be hard to deny. 
 
The Traditional Argument for Other Minds 
 
Each of us must accept that we can only have knowledge of another's behavior, movements, 
appearance, scent, etc.; none of us ever has direct access to another's mind. Typically, the philosopher 
simply accepts the existence of other human minds and moves on. The traditional philosophical 
justification for other minds is the argument from analogy. 3 Though I cannot experience your mind, I can 
experience other things which give warrant for the conclusion that you have a mind. If those things which 
give me evidence that you have a mind can be shown to be things that great apes have in common with 
us, then we can further conclude that great apes have minds as well. 
The argument for other human minds can be formulated as follows: 
 
1. Every human with property x of which I know whether or not she possesses consciousness does 
possess consciousness (namely, myself). 
2. Jones is a human with property x. 
3. Therefore, it is probable that Jones is conscious. 
 
The same argument can be used for any human who possesses the reference property x. The 
question that arises pertains to those sub-properties which constitute the reference property. If it can be 
shown that the reference property is shared by both humans and great apes, one is compelled to accept 
the existence of ape minds. I will discuss the question of specific reference properties in the following 
sections. 
The argument from analogy is at the basis of most people's acceptance of other human minds. 
Though there have been many attacks leveled against this particular argument, they need not be 
addressed here. 4 I make no claim that 
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this argument or the argument for great ape minds is strong. Instead, I argue that the acceptance of the 
argument for other human minds entails the acceptance of the parallel argument for great ape minds. 
 
Weak Versions of the Argument from Analogy for Animal Minds 
 
Historically, the question of animal sentience has been addressed in the course of utilitarian ethics. As 
Jeremy Bentham puts it, "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, can they suffer?"5 
Because of this concern, the focus of many arguments touching on animal consciousness has been the 
animal's ability to feel pain rather than the animal's consciousness itself. This method of attempting to 
establish the consciousness of animals is not passe. Recently, David Cockburn addresses this 
formulation of the argument in his article "Human beings and giant squids".6 He argues that the analogical 
method for demonstrating the consciousness of animals necessarily fails, stating that any argument of 
this sort can only undermine the conclusion it hopes to reach. Cockburn's argument follows the tradition 
set by the utilitarians and continued by contemporary philosophers such as Peter Singer,7 James 
Rachels,8 and Bernard E. Rollin.9 I will show that Cockburn's use of pain behavior as the reference 
property in an argument from analogy causes some of the problems he addresses. 
Cockburn refers to Peter Singer's argument for the animal experience of pain. This argument 
could be stated as follows: 
 
1. Humans feel pain. 
2. When humans feel pain, they exhibit behaviors x, y, and z in certain situations. 
3. Animals exhibit behaviors x, y, and z in the same type of situations. 
4. Therefore, it is likely animals feel pain. 
 
Though Singer further defends this argument by referring to the biological and evolutionary similarity of 
human and animal nervous systems, he declares that animal behavior alone is "sufficient justification for 
the belief that they feel pain". 10
Cockburn's contention is that the bodies and behaviors of humans are so different from those of 
other animals that the argument stands on shaky ground. He argues that Singer's argument is open to the 
criticism of anthropomorphism since the reference properties are not determined objectively. Though 
Cockburn is correct in criticizing Singer's argument, the solution he offers does little to help the case for 
animal minds. 
In his method of determining the similarities between humans and animals, Cockburn wisely 
attempts to describe animal behavior in such a way as to 
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avoid loaded descriptive terms such as "writhing" or "moaning". However, his method of avoiding loaded 
terms entails that it is physically impossible for the argument from analogy to conclude an animal is 
conscious. I will show why this is so in the following paragraphs. 
Cockburn claims that in order to avoid emotionally compelling descriptions, the resemblances 
between humans and other animals must be at the level of what he calls "geometrical similarity". 
Geometrical similarity requires a resemblance at the basis of physical similarity. Though Cockburn feels 
we can hear pain in a dog's yelp, the description in geometrical terms requires that the yelp is described 
solely in terms of the pitch and tone. The facial contortions of a dog present additional problems for 
Cockburn: 
 
At the level of a geometrical description the dog's face is radically different from a human face. With many 
breeds of dog the differences start at the most basic structural level: in place of the relatively flat surface in 
which eyes, nose and mouth are embedded we have a protruding cone. This difference has immediate 
implications for the possible placing and structure of the mouth: described in geometrical terms a spaniel's 
mouth is, and inevitably so, radically different from a human mouth. And that difference inevitably makes it 
obscure what it could mean to say that "the dog's mouth moved just as that human being's mouth moved". 11
 
Cockburn uses this description of animal behavior to weaken Singer's argument. His point is that 
the human behaviors x, y, and z cannot be judged to be sufficiently similar to the animal behaviors x, y, 
and z. His argument could be stated as follows: 
 
1. Humans feel pain. 
2. When humans feel pain, they vocalize in x pitch and y tone, and have facial contortions z. 
3. Animals do not vocalize in x pitch and y tone. 
4. Because of the different structure of the animal's body, the animal does not have facial 
contortions z. 
5. Therefore, it does not follow that animals feel pain. 
 
There are two problems with Cockburn's use of geometrical similarity as the reference property. It is 
apparent from the passage that Cockburn makes the requirement for attribution of pain physically and 
"inevitably" impossible to be fulfilled by any animal apart from humans. Because of differences at the 
physical level, using geometrical similarity to argue for animal consciousness is doomed from the start. 
For example, because of the differences between the human and nonhuman vocal-laryngeal apparatus, it 
is physically impossible for nonhuman animals to vocalize in a manner similar to humans. 
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Cockburn's fundamental criticism of the argument from analogy regarding nonhuman minds is 
that reference to any spec similarities between humans and animals in order to prove animal 
consciousness would be begging the question. According to this criticism, one who claims that certain 
properties (e.g. number of legs or arrangement of eyes) are relevant to the argument from analogy is 
already begging the question in favor of animal minds. Cockburn claims the choice of reference property 
is determined by one's initial unphilosophic intuitions regarding the consciousness of an animal What 
follows is that the bias in the choice of reference will determine the conclusion of the argument. That is, 
by picking out certain properties as relevant, one first assumes animals are conscious, and only then 
notices certain similarities between himself and an animal. 
Cockburn's main criticism is flawed in its misunderstanding of the argument from analogy. Any 
adequate argument from analogy requires some relevant reference property. His argument seems to rest 
on the assumption that all possible reference properties would be based at some level on intuition. 
However, it is possible to find a reasoned account of relevant reference properties that is not based on 
the conviction that animals are conscious. An examination of the argument from analogy for human minds 
can determine relevant reference properties without begging the question regarding animal minds. I will 
demonstrate how this can be done shortly. 
Though Cockburn specifically rejects the use of reference properties in his argument, he still 
accepts having a body and geometrical similarity as reference properties. Due to his desire to avoid 
begging the question, Cockburn chose reference properties so specific that he biased the argument 
against animal sentience. Taken to the extreme, geometrical similarity could even fail to prove that other 
humans have minds. 
It is no wonder Cockburn concludes that the analogical argument fails. If evidence based merely 
on the geometrical similarity of physical appearance must be used to determine sentience, one would 
have to agree that there is not overwhelming support for the case of ape consciousness. 
 
The Reference Property 
 
At this point the question of relevant properties needs to be addressed. Cockburn focused on 
geometrically physical similarities as the reference property, but geometrical similarity is not what causes 
the belief in the consciousness of another. A severely deformed human would suffer from this reference 
property. I would not be able to determine that the facial gestures of a human devastated by fire in any 
way resembled my own, yet this would not cause me to conclude the person is not conscious. As noted 
earlier, utilitarian ethics has considered the experience of pain fundamentally important. The 
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experience of pain has also historically been used in the argument for other minds. 12 But if it is simple 
pain behavior that drives us to call another conscious, one would be required to call the irritant response 
of a single-celled organism proof of its consciousness. Because we do not consider a single-celled 
organism conscious, pain behavior as the reference property would result in absurd conclusions. This 
absurd consequence is part of the problem with Cockburn's argument. This brings us back to the question 
I avoided earlier: what properties do humans exhibit which lead me to believe they are conscious? 
For the examination of the reference properties one need not beg the question in favor of great 
ape consciousness. Contra Cockburn, use of specific reference properties would not beg the question 
since one need not refer to animals in the account of relevant reference properties. The reference 
properties can be determined by examining what properties are accepted in the argument for other 
human minds. There need not be any specific appraisal of nonhuman animals in this investigation. 
I would like to point out that I do not mean to imply that the reference properties are necessary for 
consciousness; a claim such as that could not be sufficiently justified. This examination of relevant 
characteristics will not conclude with a list of the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness. I 
only wish to determine those properties humans possess which lead us to believe others are conscious. 
It seems as if we look for a combination of sub-properties to justify our belief that someone is 
conscious. Language use, tool use and creation, culture, and the ability to learn and teach have been 
considered integral to consciousness and could be used as the reference properties. I wish to 
demonstrate that the argument from analogy does not use the mere fact of physical similarity as the 
reference property. The relevance is not the similarity of another's body to my own, but the similarity of 
specific behaviors. There is no reason why a certain type of body is necessary for a creature to use 
language, make tools, etc. 
My claim in this paper is that a union of three sub-properties composes the reference property in 
the argument from analogy. Two properties psychologists attribute to conscious beings are the 
dispositional capacity for language and rational tool use. If a person is unable to learn to communicate 
with others, the question stands, how is she able to achieve self-awareness? How is she able to organize 
her world? Language is the best communicative tool humans have, and it is often thought to be what 
makes us different from other animals. Though some linguists have argued that even language trained 
apes do not employ a formal grammatical language, the intent behind language is communicative, and it 
is this notion which we can examine. Communication is not simple rule following because it requires the 
intentionality of an agent. According to H.P. Grice, there are certain intentions an agent must possess in 
order for that agent to mean something by an utterance. As well, meaning is not limited to vocal 
utterances; 
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Grice also allows for non-verbal behavior as sometimes sufficient to express meaning. 13 Grice has been 
interpreted by Daniel Dennett as requiring at least a third order intentionality in order for genuine 
communication. 14 According to this view, a computer would not be communicating if it was simply 
following the rules with which it was programmed. The notion of language is also tied to society because 
of the role language plays in interpersonal relations. This notion assumes the existence of mental 
thoughts which are meaningfully expressed. One of the sub-properties needed for the argument from 
analogy would be the dispositional capacity for communication with others. 
The invention and use of tools are thought to be correlated with rational thought because the 
agent discovers a solution to a perceived problem. Humans recognize a problem, and then determine a 
method to solve it. Tool use is only one of many methods we use to solve problems. This type of behavior 
suggests rational thought because it presents the agent acting with minimum effort to achieve a desired 
goal. This type of instrumental rationality is a property typically considered unique to humans. 
Instrumental rationality, then, will be the second sub-property to compose the conjunctive reference 
property. 
I believe there is one final requirement involved in our attribution of consciousness to other 
humans. Humans are biological organisms which possess brains. Any human who communicates and 
exhibits tool use is thought to be conscious. However, if we were to build a machine which looked like a 
human and was proficient in human speech and problem solving, we would hesitate to call the machine 
conscious. This is not to say that it is impossible for a computer to be conscious, though one of our pre-
philosophical reasons for considering other humans conscious is their possession of a biological brain. 
It is necessary to use the conjunction of communicative ability, instrumental rationality, and 
having a biological brain as the reference property for consciousness. If only one of these properties was 
used, the argument would fail. In assuming only communicative behavior one might mistakenly attribute 
meaning to certain signs which are unintentional and uncommunicative in nature. In considering only 
instrumental rationality, the argument would be a reductio ad absurdum. Accepting instrumental rationality 
as the sole reference property would entail the consciousness of many machines. An argument based 
solely on having a biological brain would simply not be compelling. At this point I will address the 
empirical evidence showing that nonhuman great apes exhibit these properties. 
 
Empirical Evidence for the Consciousness of Great Apes 
 
Since ancient times humankind has been differentiated from the rest of the animal world by the word 
"rational". As the "rational animal", humans consider themselves to have a unique dignity, a moral 
standing above all other 
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animals. Without entering into the debate on the nature of rationality, I wish to show that not only humans 
are able to think rationally. I will first focus on instrumental rationality, and present evidence that great 
apes possess certain problem solving abilities. Anecdotal evidence and cognitive research suggest that 
great apes have at least instrumental rationality. For example, chimpanzees pass those non-verbal 
cognitive tests that are typically passed by three year old children. 15  I will then present evidence 
suggesting that great apes possess the dispositional capacity for communication, since some apes can 




Comparative psychologists and ethologists have spent much time examining the problem solving abilities 
of great apes. Studies run by Wolfgang Köhler in 1925 were designed to create specific problems for his 
chimpanzees in accessing their food. He hung food out of reach overhead, locked it in a box, and kept it 
outside their cage. Köhler found that almost always the animals would find a solution to the problem of 
gaining the food, simply by using common objects kept in the cage. 16 This suggests that the chimps have 
the ability to manipulate the physical world in order to achieve a desired end which, in turn, suggests their 
possession of instrumental rationality. 
The manipulation of found objects to serve certain purposes is a variety of tool use. The actions 
of Köhler's chimpanzees mirror the tool use great apes demonstrate in the wild. Chimpanzees use at 
least five types of tools to gather insects, nuts, and honey. Some use hammers or anvil type tools to open 
nuts. Often the animal will collect these tools far from her food source and bring them back to complete a 
nut opening task. They also use tools as weapons to threaten or attack intruders. Chimpanzees have also 
been observed using leaves to clean their body of blood and feces. As well, orangutans construct shelters 
to protect themselves from rain. Some tool use behaviors are taught to one animal by another, and other 
tool use behaviors are discovered by the animal on her own. 17
Further research suggests that chimpanzees have the ability to solve conceptual analogy 
problems. The subject of David Premack's research, a chimp named Sarah, succeeded in labeling 
"same" or "different" various pairs of sentences depending on their expression of an analogous concept.18 




Language is often thought to be the definitive separation between humans and all other animals. Some 
believe language is the measuring stick for rationality.19 It is becoming clearer and clearer, however, that 
great apes are 
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able to comprehend and utilize a rudimentary language, or at least engage in obviously communicative 
behaviors. Current research in animal language is being done by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, who uses keys 
identified with geometric symbols which light when touched as a means for the subject to "talk". 20 She is 
working with Kanzi, a male bonobo who is unique in animal language research because he began to 
acquire symbol use simply by observing the attempts to train his mother. No effort had been made to train 
Kanzi, and he was not rewarded with food, as is typical, for demonstrating symbol usage. Kanzi also 
began responding appropriately to spoken English, and he shows sensitivity to word order and even 
invents grammatical rules. 
The latest research with Kanzi was an examination of his comprehension of spoken English. His 
success is compared with the success of a two year old child, Alia, who was raised in the same language 
environment by the same caretaker, and who was subjected to both spoken English and the lexical 
system from birth. Both subjects were tested on their response to a large number of novel sentences. 
The results of the test are quite interesting. Kanzi was correct on 72% of all trials, and Alia was 
correct on 66% of all trials. What these results indicate is that a bonobo can respond appropriately to 
spoken English at a rate better than a human child of two years. 
Many language trained great apes demonstrate sophistication in language production and 
comprehension of grammatical nuances. For example, Kanzi can differentiate the meanings between "Me 
tickle you" and "You tickle me". As far as specific utterances, there is a large amount of literature quoting 
great apes talking about everything from apples to where others go after death. 
 
The Argument for Great Ape Minds 
 
The argument from analogy for other minds can be used as an argument for great ape minds. I will 
present a reformulation of the traditional argument for other minds which begins with the assumption that 
humans are conscious (instead of the traditional beginning point that I am conscious) and conclude that 
great apes are conscious as well. The argument follows strictly from the traditional argument from 
analogy, where x is the conjunctive property of instrumental rationality, communicative ability, and having 
a brain. 
1. Every great ape with property x of which we know whether or not she possesses consciousness 
is conscious; all humans with the reference properties are conscious. 
2. Nonhuman great apes are a member of the class of all great apes that generally possess 
property x. 
3. Therefore, it is probable nonhuman great apes are generally conscious. 
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The argument seems inductively adequate. I have spent the body of the paper arguing for the 
relevance of the properties and the truth of the premises. The strength of the argument rests on the 
specific sub-properties used in the argument, communicative ability, instrumental rationality, and having a 
biological brain. The only criticism that might be leveled would be against the strength of the argument 
that nonhuman great apes possess these three properties. 
The importance of the argument is twofold; not only is it a strong inductive argument for the 
consciousness of nonhuman great apes, but it also compels a rational person who accepts the argument 
from analogy for other minds to accept the conclusion of the argument regarding other great apes. 
I did not prove that great apes are conscious; the quest for demonstrative certainty requires 
something stronger than an inductive argument. What is concluded, however, is that if one believes 
another human is conscious based on the argument from analogy, the rational conclusion is to believe 
that other great apes are conscious as well. This conclusion gives the supporters of equality for great 
apes the first step they need in their crusade to have great apes recognized as persons. If a being is 
rational and communicative about those things she feels and thinks, it would be nothing more than basic 
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